In what follows, I will briefly outline the three arguments, show each one's modern association with budgetary concerns, and note some instances that reveal how this association was expressed in Israeli case law. Part II will discuss the argument concerning separation of powers; part III will focus on the argument concerning the courts' competency to deal with SW rights; and part IV will discuss the objection to SW that is concerned with lack of applicability and the impact that 'futile' efforts to implement SW rights supposedly has on 'real' (ie CP) rights. I then turn, in part V, to a focused rebuttal of the fiscal objection. The chapter concludes, in part VI, with a suggestion as to why this particular objection has remained so attractive to courts and to scholars alike. I believe that the latter analysis suggests a theoretical reconstruction that has implications not only to the subject at hand, but also to the way SW rights, and rights in general, are reconstructed in contemporary judicial discourse.
II. SEPARATION OF POWERS
According to this argument, the judiciary should refrain from enforcing SW rights because acting otherwise would require the courts to adjudicate policies, priorities and, ultimately -to distribute and redistribute funds. Such a result is tantamount to the unconstitutional, illegitimate and undemocratic transfer of authority from Parliament and government to the courts.
11 Timothy Macklem's exposition of the argument reveals its strong ties to matters of resources and funding. He argues that allowing the courts power to enforce social welfare rights would grant them the role to decide the level of funding that health care should receive from the government, and . . . how that funding should be distributed . . . It would be for the courts to set the direction for the economy, to establish the curriculum for the schools, to determine environmental policy -in short, to govern. Clearly this would be undesirable, for it would have the effect of transferring virtually all democratic authority from the people's present representatives . . . to the courts whose duty it is to interpret and enforce that Constitution. 12 Frank Cross drives the point home, employing the timeless phrase and stating that 'courts understand that requiring legislatures to provide minimal levels of subsistence for all Americans encroaches upon the jealously guarded "power of the purse"'. 13 This, indeed, fits well with the US Supreme Court's self-awareness, remarking as it did that 'the intractable economic, social, and even philosophical problems presented by public welfare assistance programs are not the business of this Court'. 14 Across the ocean, the House of Lords has been characterised as holding 'a deeply embedded judicial conviction that matters of public finance are the preserve of the elected branches of government and not of courts'. 15 And the Irish Supreme Court concluded that 'it is not the function of the courts to make an assessment of the validity of the many competing claims on national resources'. And yet, on a normative level, it is simply not true that the courts can refrain from intervening in questions of distribution and redistribution. Not intervening, in such cases, would usually mean embracing the highly controversial baseline of the market, or even accepting the economic status quo that, in itself, depends on public institutions and state action. 17 The decision not to alter the 'background rules' that inform the current social and economic state of affairs is a decision in its own right. Even the distinction between 'commission' and 'omission' is not relevant in this case. For, in constitutional democracies, courts quite often protected rights to property and contract, at the expense of other social and legal interests (the Lochner era being an obvious example). 18 In Professor Tushnet's words: 'The state is complicit in creating the distribution of wealth in society whether it "acts" affirmatively or whether it does nothing but enforce the background rules of property and contract law '. 19 However, as shown by the example of Israeli health policy, the courts tend to accept the bond between fiscal considerations and the threat to separation of powers. Some background is warranted: the National Health Insurance Law, 5754-1994, establishes a basket of health services to which citizens are entitled, and the process for updating the basket. The Law grants the Ministers of Health and Finance the power to update the basket, following a recommendation by the Health Council. 20 In Maccabi Health Services v Minister of Finance, 21 the health fund challenged the Minister's refusal to update the health index, despite a unanimous recommendation to that effect by the Health Council, which was buttressed by a similar assertion by a parliamentary committee of enquiry. The Minister recognised the objective need to update the health index, but replied that budgetary constraints restrained him from acting accordingly.
The Israeli Supreme Court (ISC) dismissed this argument, mocking it as an attempt to devise a new theory of ubi remedium ibi jus -where there is a remedy there is a right 22 -instead of the other way around. The Court clarifies that where a statutory obligation is recognised, the state cannot argue that fiscal resources prevent it from living up to its duties. The Court also noted that ignoring the Health Council's opinion, undermines the Council's statutory standing as an expert advisor in the process. 23 22 See also Holmes and Sunstein (n 10) 43 (explaining that individuals enjoy rights in a legal, as opposed to a moral, sense, 'only if the wrongs they suffer are fairly and predictably redressed by their government').
23 Maccabi (n 21) 761-62.
'lofty talk', 24 the Court concluded that it cannot order the Government to spend the sums that would result from accepting the petition: 'We have never instructed the state to pay anyone out of its budget amounts of such magnitude as those that the health funds are asking for in the present matter'. 25 
III. COMPETENCE
Critiques of judicial enforcement of SW rights suggest that the courts, which hear cases on an individual basis, are not equipped to deal with issues that require a broader view. Moreover, the complex nature of social and economic issues bars the courts from truly assessing the whole environment from which the case stems and which is affected by the decision. 26 Continuing the analysis of the judicial role with respect to Israeli health policy, Chinitz and Shalev note that 'It is not surprising that the Court is hesitant to intervene in such technical and obscure fiscal matters . . . The Court is not necessarily well equipped to deal with accounting'. 27 Moreover, even appeals to courts to overturn health fund decisions are 'unlikely to succeed, unless the letter of the law has been ignored. The courts acknowledge budgetary constraints and accept standards of evidence-based medicine as benchmarks for public funding'. 28 However, as the Maccabi case, described above, suggests, it is often the political decision that is not based on 'evidence-based medicine', while the judicial one may rely on substantial expert opinion (such as that of the Health Council, in that case). Even then, extreme judicial restraint is observed.
Though courts should not be dismissive of the fact that the individual case they are addressing may have repercussions for others whose claim is not heard, it should also be recalled that courts deal, on a daily basis, with intricate economic problems that have serious ramifications in trade, business, monopolies, taxes, and similar realms. This is done, of course, with no qualms regarding competence. 29 Moreover, an institutional analysis of legislatures and courts reveals no important differences regarding the pressures to which they are subject, the considerations they take into account and the level of generality they aim for. 30 An analysis of post-Communist socio-legal developments suggests that even where constitutional courts intervened in a manner that moderated the transition to market economies, no 'disaster' has come to pass, despite warnings to that effect. 31 court lacks expertise to deal with social and economic issues, therefore, seems to rely on shaky evidence. The conclusion should be that even where budgetary issues are concerned, the court's particular expertise justifies expanding 'the normal conception of the role of the courts in a democratic society to include the role of "policy partner" in ongoing bargaining about how a state should use its scarce resources'.
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A more nuanced rebuttal to this objection stems from the fact that not all reviews of social policies are alike. An important distinction should be made at the level of remedy, between demands that the court itself erects a policy or programme, on the one hand, and charges to administer the policy in a fair and equal fashion, on the other hand. 33 An example of the latter case is the Canadian Government's refusal to provide sign language interpreters to deaf patients on the basis that it would put a 'severe strain on the fiscal sustainability of the health care system'. 34 The Court reasoned that 'The Legislature, upon defining its objective as guaranteeing access to a range of medical services, cannot evade its obligations . . . to provide those services without discrimination by appointing hospitals to carry out that objective'. 35 The Court may well be hesitant to dictate the erection of a particular medical service, but once the Government decided to enter the field, 'it must provide all the services within the genre' 36 to all the relevant recipients. We find, once again, that the ability to link such SW challenges to the duty to treat all citizens with equal concern and respect increases their appeal.
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And yet, while this approach seems quite appealing, it also raises a particular difficulty: the fact that court decisions that give effect to SW rights are deemed justifiable only when a given policy is in effect suggests that it is the principle of non-discrimination, rather than social and economic rights, that is doing 'the work'. The result is twofold: first, as a principled matter, rather than undermining the 'liberal' (in the European sense) tendencies of the courts, this approach reveals a willingness to entertain SW challenges only when they can be broken down to an individual's (preferably -nameable individual's) interests, but not when they are presented as collective harms, however ill-conceived, unprofessional and harmful to constitutional rights. Secondly, the concrete effects of the approach are noticeable, insofar as the remedy is concerned: instead of a generalised (or even generalizable) injunction, the court will solve a particular problem for a particular individual. In doing so, it will also praise the importance of SW rights, and mock the irrelevance of budgetary concerns, which will be relatively minimal in the case at hand. We find, then, that this approach does not only trace the limits of the ability to challenge social and economic policies in a successful manner (ie when discrimination is established). It also reinforces, rather than undermines, the traditional objection to the court's ability to reach decisions that have complex, and perhaps unpredictable, consequences, an objection that is especially visible where SW rights are concerned.
A few Israeli cases from the field of education seem particularly relevant: in Botzer, the ISC ruled that a school must make the necessary physical arrangements to grant a 32 Scheppele (n 31) 1935. 33 child who suffers from multiple sclerosis and is bound to a wheelchair, easy access to and from his classroom. 38 The Court did not miss the opportunity to assert that 'ensuring equal opportunity . . . costs money' and that the constitutional right to dignity includes the right to equal opportunities in education. 39 Needless to say, the judgment did not require all schools in Israel to make similar modifications to allow children with disabilities to be integrated in the general school system. Indeed, the very same year the ISC rejected a petition that challenged a ministerial (and not statutory) budgetary decision to cut a programme that assists the children suffering from environmental disadvantage and helps them integrate, socially and intellectually, into the general school system. 40 The Court distinguished its decision from Botzer, stating that 'the principle of equal opportunity does not stand alone. It cannot be severed from the general social context. The realization of the principle requires resource allocation. The financial ability of the government authority should be balanced against the needs'. 41 A similar fate was in store for a petition to force the Ministry to apply provisions of the Special Education Law 5748-1988 that require the integration of children with special needs in the general education system to children aged three to four. 42 In a brief judgment, the Court acknowledged that the professional consensus is that the integration of children with disabilities enhances their social and intellectual ability, and that time is of critical importance. 43 But it rejected the charge, stating that the limited budgetary abilities require prioritization, and that is left to the Government. 44 Such budgetary considerations were left irrelevant when the ISC considered a demand that a municipality shoulder the costs of transferring a child who suffered severe social problems in her original school. 45 The ISC relied on the constitutional right to education that should be supplied free of charge, including in cases where particular solutions are necessary.
A pattern emerges: when a general social problem is laid down for the court, budgetary concerns are raised. When a very similar social issue (eg integration of children into schools) is broken down -the court is much more receptive. As Tushnet's summary of Irish cases reveals, the same pattern is observed in other countries. 46 
IV. APPLICABILITY AND SPILLOVER EFFECTS
This argument suggests that, because of their budgetary implications, SW rights simply cannot be enforced. It would seem surprising to find a court stating such a rationale explicitly and, indeed, no such sentiment appears in ISC (or other court's) judgments that I am aware of. However, the centrality of this argument as a wedge to distinguish 38 CP from SW rights in academic writings, 47 and its strong relation to budgetary concerns, merits some discussion here.
Frank Cross explains that courts 'avoid involving themselves in matters fundamental to the enforcement of positive rights'. 48 The argument is very similar to that of Maurice Cranston's, almost 50 years ago. 49 Though they do not state the argument explicitly in these terms, it can be understood from the thrust of Cranston's and Cross's argument, that the recognition of one type of right (social or economic) to which one cannot give effect may lead to a derogation of the status of rights in general and to the state's commitment to the protection of rights.
Cass Sunstein articulated this concern, stating that
[i]f positive rights are not enforceable, the constitution itself may seem like a mere piece of paper; there could be adverse consequences for other rights as well . . . the existence of unenforceable rights will in turn tend to destroy the negative rights -freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and so forth -that might otherwise be genuine ones. If some rights are shown to be unenforceable, it is likely that other rights will be unenforceable as well.
50
But this worry seems to rest on the fallacious assumption that if a right is recognised, it should always trump other interests. However, there is no reason to assume that advocates of the right assume that it is an absolute one, or that the state is under a duty to invest all its resources in one right or another. As Joseph Raz notes, the tendency to portray support for certain rights as espousing a position in favour of absolute rights amounts to a 'simple mistake' which is more common than what would be expected:
The fact that a given right can be overridden by moral considerations, just like the fact that it can be overridden by another legal right, shows nothing except that it is not an absolute right which defeats all contrary considerations.
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Of course, if a full realization of the right to health and education would require that everyone be able to enjoy free comprehensive health services on demand and free education to her heart's content, it may well be that no country will ever have the financial capabilities necessary to hold up to such a standard. This does not imply, however, that within the domestic legal system these rights carry no weight, and surely does not demand the conclusion that they are not rights at all. Despite attempts to dismiss rights that correspond to 'imperfect obligations' (used here to refer to obligations that cannot be addressed in full), 52 the feasibility of enforcement of rights is not a criterion (or at least not an overwhelming criterion) when dealing with the question of recognition of rights. Since rights cost money, the decision to realise civil and political rights by policing political demonstrations that people find offensive, for example, may divert funds 47 away from building hospitals. Such a decision, in other words, is a political and not a conceptual one. 53 
V. THE FISCAL OBJECTION REVEALED AND DISCUSSED
In the discussion above, I briefly addressed each of the objections noted above in their new, 'fiscal', dressing. However, as noted, all these arguments collapse, in their contemporary versions, into objections that have money at the centre of their interest. 54 Further evidence that the arguments discussed are strongly linked to fiscal constraints in contemporary discourse is revealed in the negative. In the (justifiably) celebrated South African Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) case, 55 the Constitutional Court ordered the Government to distribute a drug, Nevirapine, that reduces the transmission of HIV/AIDS from pregnant mothers to children. The interesting point, for present purposes, is that the drug's manufacturer was willing to supply as much as was needed at no cost.
TAC presented a complex case that required proper professional and bureaucratic expertise, where it could be expected that bona fide questions of competence could be raised. This matter was indeed acknowledged by the South African Constitutional Court.
56 And yet, instead of deferring to the Government's discretion, the Constitutional Court addressed and dismissed the relevant arguments (efficacy, safety, biomedical resistance, cultural reservations to bottle feeding, absence of clean water) one by one. 57 Similarly, the Constitutional Court rejected the Government's position that it is not in a position to distribute the drug across the country as 'not relevant to the question' at hand. 58 The reason for such an outright rejection of the Government's arguments in such a complex case seems clear. Where the fiscal impact of compliance is small, the normative objections seem to wither away. 59 What made the decision 'a relatively easy one for the Court', argues Denis Davis, was the lack of 'any sustainable argument concerning distributional questions'. 60 Indeed, when the ISC discussed a parallel case, the ISC distinguished the matter from TAC by noting (and emphasizing) that, in the latter case, 'the drug was distributed free of charge'. 61 It makes sense, therefore, to focus on the argument that the fact that enforcement of SW rights requires public funds is, in and of itself, sufficient to bar them from judicial enforcement.
The surprisingly trivial refutation of this argument is that while SW rights do indeed require funds, they are not unique in doing so. 62 However, where CP rights (including equality) are concerned, the courts are quite impatient with such arguments. Thus, the Canadian Supreme Court accepted a claim that a benefit policy was discriminatory, and was undeterred by the fiscal implications, noting that 'any remedy granted by a court will have some budgetary repercussions whether it be a saving of money or an expenditure of money'. 63 And in Singh, 64 the same Court rejected the Government's position that refugees can be denied an oral hearing because of the unreasonable budgetary burden that granting such a right would entail. 65 Similarly, the South African Constitutional Court ruled that prisoners may not be denied the right to vote, even though granting them such rights may have serious logistic and financial implications. 66 In Israel, the Supreme Court stated that it is 'natural' that implementing equality (in this case -to women in the air force) would have financial consequences. 67 In fact, where equality is concerned, the ISC repeated the simple statement that 'human rights cost money' on several occasions: when accepting the charge that forcing airline cabin attendants to retire at 60 constitutes age discrimination; 68 when accepting the claim that different early retirement arrangements for men and women cannot be justified by budgetary concerns; 69 when stating that such concerns cannot justify discrimination between groups entitled to benefits and subsidies; 70 when ordering a deeper drill for a pipe line to avoid harming graves, at the cost of 500,000 NIS (New Israeli Shekel); 71 and when striking down a law that permits holding accused soldiers for extensive periods before seeing a judge. 72 As trivial as this seems, a testament to the power of the original argument discussed in this part is the fact that two prominent constitutional scholars, Stephen Holmes and Cass Sunstein, dedicated a book to refuting it. The main argument in The Cost of Rights 73 is clearly stated in the introduction:
To the obvious truth that rights depend on government must be added a logical corollary, one rich with implications: rights cost money . . . The right to freedom of contract has public costs no less than the right to health care, the right to freedom of speech no less than the right to decent housing. All rights make claims upon the public treasury. 74 tional, CP rights, is one of quantity, not quality. In other words, it is indeed true that both 'types' cost money, but the degree of SW expenditure is of such a different magnitude that it demands a conceptually different treatment. 75 This position, positively noted by the ISC, 76 suggests that, because SW rights require massive distributions of funds, they raise questions of competence and democratic legitimacy in a way that minor expenditures that result from decisions concerning CP rights do not. There are two different responses to this renewed version of the traditional argument. The first relates to the above discussion, concerning the importance of the remedy sought when assessing the legal challenge. 77 The reason that the remedy comes to the fore is that, since almost all modern nations have in place governmental health care, education, subsistence support and similar programmes, demands that the court institute a new social programme 'from scratch' are extremely rare. 78 Much more common -and potentially costly -are demands that existing social policies should not discriminate against defined groups (women, single parents, single sex couples, immigrants, etc). And yet, even those advancing the objection under review do not suggest that the courts should refrain from scrutinizing claims of discrimination, even against the background of SW policy. 79 A second response to this objection takes it at face value: even if there is a clear way of distinguishing CP claims from SW claims (as was made clear, at least equality blurs the line), the argument relies on empirical evidence that is not offered. In fact, there may well be evidence to the contrary. The Costs of Rights, in fact, includes an appendix entitled 'Some Numbers on Rights and Their Costs', 80 exemplifying the astounding cost of CP rights enforcement in the US. For example, the Federal prison system costs $2.465 billion; the Federal court system costs almost $1.5 billion; the joint cost of animal and plan inspection and food and safety inspection is close to $1 billion; Defence Department obligations exceed $20 billion; environmental protection (clear air, hazardous waste, natural resources, and water quality) costs over $1.3 billion; and Census Bureau activities, government publications, postal services and national archives cost over $500 million.
In Israel, several cases can be noted to make the same point. While finding that the 'Gaza Disengagement plan' is constitutional, the ISC struck down four compensation mechanisms to (former) settlers in the region. 81 A senior Ministry of Finance official estimated the cost of the judgment at 500 million NIS, raising the total cost to 7.5 billion NIS, 82 while a subsequent report issued by the Knesset (Israeli Parliament) Research and Information Center assessed the cost of the judgment at 10.8 billion NIS (about $3 billion). 83 complete the necessary defence for classrooms in the Gaza vicinity, despite warnings that the costs would reach 'hundreds of millions of NIS in the short run, and probably several billion NIS in the long run'. 84 The overall cost of the ISC's orders to dismantle (and re-erect) certain segments of the separation barrier 85 is estimated at 1.5 billion NIS ($416 million). 86 The ISC's unprecedented decision to strike down a law that would authorise the establishment of a private prison 87 has been estimated to cost the tax payer up to 637 million NIS ($177 million). 88 Another case merits particular mention, as it combines exceptional, clear financial consequences with the Court's refusal to give them any consideration. In addition, the case manifests the Court's complete disregard of the Government's legitimate priorities and rationales. In the case, Dan Area Revenue Service v Perry, 89 the ISC denied an appeal on the Tel-Aviv District Court's decision, according to which child care should be recognised as exemptions for tax purposes. The decision was made despite the Ministry of Finance's assertion that it would cost the public treasury over 3 billion NIS ($900 million) per year. 90 Where the tax interests of successful lawyers are concerned, it would seem, fiscal concerns lose their appeal.
When SW claims appear before the Court, particularly in their 'naked' form which highlights the fiscal aspect, the Court's worst fears are met with an unmitigated reply. In Manor 91 and in Commitment to Peace 92 claims were made that social benefit cuts (to old age pensions and to subsistence benefits, respectively) infringe an impoverished individual's ability to a life of dignity and undermine the right to social security. 93 In light of the above, the fact that the Court ruled against the claimants is not surprising.
The surprise, or disappointment, stems from ISC's logic, which is a testament to its complete deference to government fiscal policy. The Israeli constitutional method that has developed over the past two decades involves a three-stage analysis. 94 First, the court assesses whether a constitutional right has been violated. If so, it continues to assess whether the infringement is by law, proportionate to the benefit, and cannot be achieved by less harmful means. The third stage involves a discussion of the constitutional remedy, if necessary.
In the vast majority of cases, the court is very lenient insofar as the first stage is concerned, and focuses its attention on the second stage. The court, in other words, is ready to recognise an infringement of constitutional right even when it is patently clear that the infringement is justified, and marginal when compared to the beneficial objective that the law in question achieves. 95 The sizable majority of petitions are denied, therefore, only after the proportionality of the violation is assessed, along with a cost-benefit analysis and an enquiry to see if the objective can be achieved at a lesser harm to the right.
The ISC's analysis in Manor and Commitment to Peace was quite different. Despite the significant cut in benefits (in some cases -up to 30 per cent), the Court was unwilling to rule that the laws in question infringed the constitutionally recognised (at least in rhetoric) right to social security at all. 96 We find, then, that while the Court expands its understanding of the scope of CP rights and, consequently, the occasions where a violation is exhibited, its construction of SW rights is much more narrow, and its willingness to acknowledge a violation -much more limited.
A very similar path was taken, in a series of cases, by the European Court of Human Rights, which struck down claims for subsistence benefits at the preliminary stage. Even though the claimant lacked any independent means of support, the Court ruled that the claim is 'manifestly ill-founded' since it was not clear that there were no alternative support systems. 97 Similarly, the Canadian Supreme Court rejected a claim to equalise general assistance benefits to young adults (under 30), stating that there is no legal support to the claim that a reduced benefit (one-third) constitutes a substantive constitutional harm. 98 Finally, an issue that posits the tension rights and money in their pure form has the potential to occupy the courts time and time again in the future. The matter, which may be termed colloquially as 'chipping in', concerns the conditioning of rights on payment.
Here again we find a very different judicial approach where CP and SW are assessed.
In the case of Fordyce County 99 the US Supreme Court ruled that the Government cannot charge the immediate users of freedom of speech, such as protesters in a public park, for the expenses for speech related activities. And in a very similar Israeli case, the ISC recognised the police's power to subject a protest license to certain conditions that are relevant to matters of public order, but ruled that 'setting a price for the implementation of a right means violating the rights of those who cannot afford it'. 100 But this sentiment is somewhat more attenuated when SW issues are concerned.
As emerges from Eva Brems's portrayal of several copayment cases in Europe, the courts are unwilling to allow even a preliminary judicial review of the position that substantial copayments violate the right to health and to equality. 101 Similarly, in Israel, a woman who required surgery so as not to lose her hearing was asked to pay 70 per cent of the cost. 102 Being a teacher and a single parent, she could not afford the 'bill', and challenged the onerous copayment requirement. In rhetoric that is strikingly different from the one employed in the free speech cases, the ISC stated that when priorities are to be set, the judiciary should defer its judgment to professional committees, such as the one that deliberated the question in this case. 103 In conclusion, it would be worthwhile to refer to Ruth Gavison's suggestion that the Court's most marked deference to governmental priorities is visible in cases where 'human and social interaction' 104 is necessary. Contrariwise, we find that such deference is actually most notable in social policy cases where the budgetary requirements are pure and clear.
VI. HOW DID IT COME TO THIS? RIGHTS AS SOCIAL BARGAINS
The discussion to this point has shown how objections to SW rights, proven unsuccessful on their own terms, have been transformed to fiscal arguments, and have been remarkably triumphant in doing so. Moreover, as the preceding part has shown, this resurgence has taken place despite the fact that arguments focused on budgetary matters fail to distinguish convincingly between SW matters and traditional rights litigation.
I end this chapter with the suggestion that this specific transformation, and its success, is not coincidental. In fact, the fiscal redressing of the arguments against SW rights is part of a larger phenomenon, one that has deeper meanings and wider consequences. Legal discourse is in the process of restructuring rights as 'conditional' 105 or, in the terminology suggested by Sunstein and Holmes (importantly -in the closing sections of a book arguing against fiscal objections to SW rights) -as 'social bargains'. These are the makings of 'consumer-citizenship', 106 one that is 'reconceived in terms of consumption and participation in markets'. 107 The importance of this trend has been noted: if the welfare state was once understood to reflect 'the subordination of market price to social justice, the replacement of the free bargain by the declaration of rights', 108 it is now urged that 'that trajectory has been reversed'. 109 What are the jurisprudential consequences of the central role that market discourse has captured in policymaking? Borrowing a phrase from a different jurisprudential debate, it may be suggested that the fiscal paradigm has the potential to lead to a situation whereby 'rights become illusory' since they would 'extend only up to the point where our actions ceased to make a net contribution to the collective project'. 110 Curiously, while the above quote was meant to criticise a dominant theory of rights, 111 it is almost an exact translation of some ISC (and other court) pronouncements dealing with SW rights. Thus, in Manor, the Court stated that the objective of 'healing the market' is 'important to preserve the social structure, which in turn protects human rights'. 112 With respect to the rights of manpower workers, Court President Barak stated that 'it is worth harming human rights to preserve a social structure that protects human rights'. 113 The relevance to our current discussion is made explicit by the fact that the ISC supported the above statement with a reference to another case -Kontram v Ministry of Treasury 114 -which, somewhat surprisingly, 'is considered an important contribution to the emergence of social rights in the [Israeli] Supreme Court'. 115 The case involved an administrative matter of licensing, quite unrelated to social rights. Zamir J does suggest that 'human rights are, indeed, of supreme importance'. 116 But he continues:
But that is just one role [of the government] . . . In fulfilling our role, each of us must accept a system of responsibilities, not only towards other individuals, but also towards society in general . . . That is how I perceive the social contract.
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The quote is important, I believe, because the language placing 'rights besides duties'; 'no rights without responsibilities'; 118 and rights as 'social bargains' or 'community assets' 119 forms and informs the judicial manifestation of the social contract version that is currently in vogue. 120 In particular, positing rights against general welfare, and rights against social justice, allows even those who express support for SW rights to subject them to general interest. The following quote, from Court President Barak, is part of that particular agenda: 'the normative status and scope of the right to social security . . . is derived from the nature of the economic and social regime that governs a certain society . . . It expresses the economic strength of its market'. 121 It would seem difficult to offer a better example to support Simmonds' warning that rights may end up serving merely as place holders for forms of protection, that are 'balanced against countervailing considerations, so that the protections that finally result are the outcome of this calculus of conflicting reasons'. 122 The natural result, per Simmonds and others, is that 'rights or the interests of the rightholders would play no strategic role in moral and political affairs'. 123 While this proposition seems somewhat extreme as a general assessment, it has merit insofar as SW rights discourse in Israel (and elsewhere) is concerned.
The important point here is the conceptual one. It is expressed in the ISC's succinct statement that, in some cases, 'where there is no budget, there is no right'. 124 It should be made clear that the Court does not express the obvious truth that budgetary considerations may limit the implementation of the right. Rather, it suggests that they are, as Dennis Davis argues when discussing South African cases, 'in effect . . . defined in terms of availability of resources'.
125 He refers to Chaskalson P's conclusion, according to which: 'access to housing, health care, food, water and social security are dependent upon the resources available for such purposes, and that the corresponding rights themselves are limited by reason of the lack of resources'.
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VII. CONCLUSION Despite assertions to the contrary, objections to SW rights have not disappeared. In fact, the current divide between SW rights and traditional, CP rights, seems wider than ever. The explanation for this curious situation, this chapter argued, lies in the fact that while the original objections were found unconvincing on their face, their contemporary versions capture the sign of the times: the market, consumer-citizenship paradigm. Costs, budgets and economic criteria are naturally central to this paradigm and thus re-enforce arguments that were on the verge of extinction. But history had a different idea in mind, and not for the first time. Over 200 years ago, Jeremy Bentham wrote of the social contract: 'I was in hope . . . that this chimera had been effectively demolished by Mr Hume. I think we hear not so much of it now as formerly'.
127 So now, insofar as paradigms supporting social policy are concerned, we hear of little else other than the social contract. And as the previous part of this chapter hypothesised, this paradigm, along with its derivatives, are playing a role in forming the new challenge for advocates of SW rights.
